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In many ways, the current wave of ‘anti-Americanism’ is nothing new. Much of the 
post-Cold War criticism directed towards American foreign policy by certain sections of the 
Australian community bears a striking resemblance to those expressed by Americans, and non-
Americans alike, during the Cold War itself. Anti-Americanism, as this paper and others have 
defined it, is less that of an critical attitude based upon both empirical evidence and an 
appreciation of history than it is an ideologically driven, oftentimes hateful outlook, 
characterised by a simplistic belief that American policymakers are mean-spirited, racist, and 
essentially evil.1 What is intriguing is the fact that these expressions mirror many of those 
assumptions driving the Cold War paradigm of ‘New Left Revisionism’ that came to 
prominence in the United States during the late 1960’s and was part of the evolution of Cold 
War interpretation precipitated by the rise of Cold War ‘Realism’. Whilst the nature and 
intensity of the Realist and New Left critiques differs to that put forth by proponents of anti-
Americanism today, this essay demonstrates that the continuity between this post-Cold War 
phenomenon and the evolution of Cold War interpretation is indeed remarkable.2 
 
With this in mind however, the purpose of this paper is as much an effort to illustrate 
this evolution as it is an examination of the enduring questions precipitated by the Realists, 
given great impetus by the New Left, and seized upon by those Australians of anti-American 
persuasion today. By engaging these questions, this paper urges a more balanced and objective 
view of American foreign policy during both the Cold War and otherwise, and seeks to put 
criticisms of such policy in proper perspective. In sum, it seeks to neither justify, nor criticise 
Realism, the New Left, or proponents of ‘anti-Americanism’ but simply to illuminate some of 
the complexities inherent in these enduring questions upon which their views are based. 
 In spite of its present day veracity, it is intriguing to note that present day anti-
Americanism in the Western world actually had moderate, indeed humble, beginnings. The 
paradigm of Cold War Realism was a response to what many, if not most, in the American 
national security establishment perceived to be the ‘changing tide’ of the Cold War during the 
early 1950’s. The Soviet atomic explosion in August 1949, the Communist victory in the 
Chinese Civil War in October the same year, the signing of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact 
in February four months later, the North Korean invasion into South Korea in June 1950, and 
                                                     
1 Stephen Morris, “USA: A Valued Friend”, The Australian, October 23, 2003. Whilst the differences 
between legitimate criticism and ideological disdain are oftentimes difficult to define, the most obvious examples of 
anti-Americanism can be found in hard left movements such as the Socialist Alliance. A more moderate, if 
ambiguous example is The Australian’s Phillip Adams. See, for instance, “Bush-Whacked by White House Follies”, 
The Australian, 8 October 2003; “Dumb and Dumberer”, Ibid, October 4, 2003, “Iraq Destroys Career of Three War 
Chiefs” September 9, 2003.   
2 For a recent survey of Cold War literature, see Walter Hixson, “Cold War Evolution and Interpretations” 
in Richard Burns, Alexander Deconde, et al, (Eds) The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. (NY: 
Scribner, 2002) p.207-222. 
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the Chinese intervention in December that year, seemed to make explicit a presumption that had 
been latently held by key figures in Washington for some time. Because the Soviet Union and 
the Peoples Republic of China were authoritarian regimes with repressive political systems, they 
were predisposed to the use of force in obtaining their objectives on the world stage. When 
taken in conjunction with their presumed first-strike nuclear capability and their possession of 
the largest ground force on the globe, the sheer brutality through which the Soviet Union 
secured its post-war sphere of influence in eastern Europe led most in the American national 
security establishment to conclude that the Communist bloc was committed to the overthrow of 
the so-called ‘Free World’ through all means necessary.3 
This ‘orthodox’ view of American Cold War history, held by a generation who 
witnessed first-hand the ‘appeasement’ of Nazi Germany at Munich in the late 1930’s, the 
attack upon Pearl Harbour by fascist Japan, and the horrors of the second World War, was 
driven by the conviction that the authoritarian Soviet Union appeared to be much the same as 
the authoritarian Nazi Germany. Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Paul Nitze, 
and Omar Bradley chose to believe the worst and perceived the liberal, democratic ‘Free 
World’, led by the United States, as the sole bulwark against Communist tyranny. This orthodox 
tradition, with Cold War moral superiority as its primary base, has continued to a more or lesser 
extent in contemporary historical circles. Like the officials of the time, adherents to this view 
believe that responses to Soviet ‘aggression’ were therefore reasonable, or at the very least 
understandable and defensible.4 
At the time, however, this perceived change in the tide of the Cold War was not shared 
by all. A number of prominent policymakers and journalists experienced in international affairs 
in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, thought that the Kremlin was not so much 
committed to global preponderance of Soviet Communism as it was using Communism as a 
façade under which to simply pursue its traditional need for security. As figures such as Walter 
Lippman, Hans Morganthau, and the so-called ‘father’ of the Containment strategy, George 
Kennan, saw it, Soviet intransigence was an outgrowth of the traditional ‘Russian’ experience, 
and the fact that Russia itself had been invaded countless times in its recent history. Rather than 
a desire to erode the ‘Free World’, the Realists believed that Soviet behaviour reflected its 
obsession with security, driven by a need to minimise the threat of invasion by creating buffer 
states ‘friendly’ to the Kremlin. In sum, the Soviet Union was not embarking on a grand design 
                                                     
3 For the most prominent works on the early Cold War era, see John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History. (NY: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Melvyn P. Leffler. A Preponderance of 
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1992).  
4 This is best represented by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, “Origins of the Cold War”, Foreign Affairs, 46 (Oct 
1967) p.22-52.  
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for world domination, but was simply behaving as a traditional nation-state, sensitive to 
contemporary power realities.5. 
This view of Soviet intentions led many of the Realists to believe that the American 
national security establishment, whilst well intentioned, misread the ‘lessons’ of history6, and 
thus overstated the nature and extent of the Soviet ‘threat’. It was believed that because the 
Kremlin was not bent on world domination, the Truman Doctrine’s commitment to ‘oppressed 
peoples everywhere’, the excessive militarisation of the Containment strategy, and the immense 
fiscal burden required to sustain it, was imprudent, if not foolish. It drew attention away from 
the core interests of Western Europe, contradicted the time-honoured principle of balance of 
power, allowed strategic commitments to outpace resources, and above all else, bordered 
dangerously close to the creation of a ‘garrison state’. As with Cold War orthodoxy, this strand 
of thought has continued in historical circles in the present day. Generally speaking, Realism 
has argued that the because Soviet intentions were much more modest than orthodoxy made out, 
the United States could have taken a more conciliatory stance without compromising its security 
and that of its allies, prevented a spiralling and costly arms race, and avoided the worst 
moments of the Cold War.7  
To many, the Vietnam War vindicated these concerns. Perceptions of the Communist 
‘monolith’ that had existed since the early 1950’s led many to believe that North Vietnam was 
in pawn in the Kremlin’s grand design for world domination, and that non-Communist 
Indochina was the ‘keystone in the arch’ for limiting the spread of Soviet influence in Asia. 
Consequently, American policymakers of the early Cold War applied both the Truman Doctrine 
and Containment strategy and thus gradually supplanted the French colonial presence in 
Indochina that had been in effect since the end of World War II. To the Realists, the move into 
Indochina was viewed as an imprudent one. The apparently exaggerated view of Soviet 
intentions that underpinned American policy led many to misperceive Vietnamese nationalism 
as Soviet inspired Communism. This apparent misinterpretation had lead to precisely what 
                                                     
5 See for instance, George F. Kennan. The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic 
Age. (NY; Pantheon, 1982); idem, Memoirs (NY: Little Brown, 1972); and American Diplomacy 1900-1950. 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1952). For a fine analysis of Kennan’s views and the manner in which they shaped 
American foreign policy, see Wilson D. Miscamble. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy 
1947-1950. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). For Morgenthau’s critique see Hans J. Morgenthau. 
American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination. (London: Methuen, 1952). For a background into Lippman’s 
interpretations see Walter Lippman. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1943). 
6 For the best treatment of how American Cold War policymakers interpreted, or perhaps misinterpreted, 
the experience of Nazi Germany, see Ernest R. May. “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in 
American Foreign Policy. (NY: Oxford University Press, 1973.) p. See also Siracusa, “The Munich Analogy” in 
Deconde & Burns, et al, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, (2002). 
7 The most prominent historical study in this vein is Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960. 
(Princeton; NJ, 1962). In particular, Graebner has indicated that many of the orthodox Cold War view, “lived in an 
imaginary world”. Interview with Norman Graebner, December 19, 2001, Charlottesville, VA, USA. 
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Realists had continually warned about – a critical drain on national resources, and overextension 
in a conflict that was far removed from the critical priority of Western Europe.8 
 In as much, then, as Realism was a response to the events of the early 1950’s, the 
phenomenon that was New Left Revisionism was in turn a response to this seeming vindication 
of Realism through the Vietnam War. Indochina. Having perceived the Cold War through this 
prism as well as being heavily influenced by Marxist ideology, the New Left tended to view the 
United States as primarily responsible at least for the way in which the Cold War developed if 
not for the Cold War itself. The New Left historiography, led by William Appleman Williams, 
nearly reversed Cold War orthodoxy, portraying the Soviets on the defensive and American 
“aggression” as responsible for struggles of the post-war era. As one commentator has 
remarked, the New Left argument was one that could be best interpreted as “an ongoing 
function of America’s capitalist political economy…whose structural dynamics required both 
ever-expanding markets for a continuous flow of surplus goods and capital and easy access to 
raw materials in a freely trading world”. The New Left critique essentially turned those of the 
orthodox and Realist variety ‘inside out’, claiming that the American commitment to Europe 
after World War II was more about the securing of markets for the American capitalist economy 
– and thus an end in itself - than it was a means of defending the ‘Free World’ against the Soviet 
Union.9  
The New Left thus portrayed the United States as an imperialist power, motivated by a 
malignant grand design of their own – the expansion of capitalism at whatever cost. If, to the 
Realists, the Vietnam War seemed to prove that American policymakers were well intentioned 
but misguided, then to the New Left it proved these individuals to be calculated and mean-
spirited, if not simply ‘evil’.10 Consequently, the Soviet Union was seen, more or less, as 
innocent in terms of Cold War culpability. 
It was initially thought that the welcome, if unexpected, end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent opening of Communist Bloc archives would finally settle the long standing debate 
over the conduct of American foreign policy and the motives behind its policymakers. 
Unfortunately, this access has not been as easy, nor insightful, as was originally believed. The 
post-Cold War literature has been far from conclusive in vindicating either orthodox, Realist, or 
New Left claims.11 What is clear, however, is that much of the criticism directed toward 
                                                     
8 Consult Gaddis, We Now Know, (1997) and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, (1992). 
9 See William Appleman Williams. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. 2nd ed. (NY; Dell, 1972). 
10 For a useful insight into the New Left in general, and the Revisionst-Realist relationship in particular, see 
Joseph M. Siracusa. New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. (Claremont, CA: 
Regina Books, 1993), especially pages 1-20. Apart from Williams, the most prominent New Left work is by Gabriel 
Kolko. The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945. (NY; Random House, 1968).  
11 The historical debate over the Korean War is perhaps the clearest example of this. For an example 
concluding that the Korean War was initiated by North Korean leader Kym Ill Sung, see Vladislav Zubok and 
 5
American foreign policy during the Cold War by Americans themselves, mirrors that directed 
towards American policy by Americans and non-Americans alike in the present day. Like the 
Realists, many contemporary Australian commentators believe that American policymakers 
have, at various times, exaggerated foreign dangers, misapplied the so-called ‘lessons’ of 
history, and missed chances to promote stability because of a failure to show conciliation 
towards America’s enemies. More strident, if not ideologically driven, critics, however, claim 
that the expansion of the American ‘empire’ is driven almost exclusively by malignant self-
interest, and even racism. The lack of definitive evidence from eastern archives as to these 
unresolved questions over the prudence, wisdom, and motivation of American Cold War policy 
has added great vigour to the debate over American foreign policy in the post Cold War world. 
The evolution, then, of anti-Americanism gradually becomes clear. The enduring 
questions initiated by Realists, and given momentum by the New Left, and present in various 
contemporary incarnations have been injected with a new sense of ideologically motivated 
ferocity. Whatever one thinks of those with anti-American inclinations, it is true that more 
moderate critics are not without merit. For instance, one of the great ironies of the Cold War 
involved that underlying perhaps its central premise, that of democracy versus authoritarianism. 
American policymakers frequently portrayed the Cold War as a literal battle between freedom 
and tyranny, an image evident in the rhetoric expressed at the public level, through to the 
highest echelons of foreign policymaking.  
Yet in this battle for free world supremacy against the tyrannical Soviet Union, the 
United States frequently allied itself with regimes whose methods of rule differed little from 
that of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, the United States supported right-wing 
dictatorships in an effort to undermine left-wing ones. Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai 
Shek, South Korean president Syngman Rhee, South Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai, Iranian 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and most recently, the Taliban, are notable examples. Whilst 
most of this can be explained through the traditional practice of Realpolitik – or more simply, 
‘the enemy of my enemy is therefore my friend’ - the question of whether such practices were 
justified is a different one altogether. If anything, it certainly blurred the distinctions between 
the free world and the Kremlin, cast aspersions on the self-perceived moral superiority of the 
United States, and legitimised much of the criticism towards American foreign policy during 
both the Cold War and beyond.  
                                                                                                                                                           
Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 1999.) p.54.  A more orthodox version can be found in Douglas J. Macdonald, “Communist Bloc 
Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism”, International Security, Vol. 20, no. 3 
(Winter 1995). 
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 Another strong argument revolved around the supposition that had the United States 
been more conciliatory towards the Soviet Union some of the most dangerous episodes in the 
Cold War could have been prevented. Like the Realists of the time, recent historiography 
emanating from the former eastern bloc archives suggests that the extent of the Soviet threat 
was nowhere near that of the prevailing view. American policymakers misperceived not just the 
nature of Soviet intentions, but that of Soviet military capabilities as well.12 From this 
apparently distorted view of the Soviet Union American policymakers created their own Cold 
War responses, which in turn, engendered a spiral of mistrust. Viewed in these terms, the 
nuclear brinkmanship that defined the Cuban Missile Crisis13, as well as the trillions of dollars 
spent on the arms race suggest that the Cold War was unnecessary, if not tragic. These charges 
resonate throughout many contexts of Australian society and culture in the present day. Similar 
to the way many perceived its relationship to the Soviet Union, American foreign policy is seen 
as unnecessarily belligerent, devoid of conciliation, and as the recent debate - if not furore – 
over the intelligence regarding the war in Iraq seems to illustrate, is based upon distorted views 
of capabilities, if not intentions, of its enemies.  
 So what, then, do we make of this question whether or not American policymakers, 
during both the Cold War and beyond, were: misguided; prone to distorted world-views, driven 
by exaggerated fears as put forth by Realists; hubristic, self-interested, and economically driven, 
as asserted by the New Left; and mean-spirited, racist and essentially ‘evil’ by anti-Americans? 
Assuming both the Cold War Realists and present day critics are correct, the conduct and 
motives of American foreign policy leave a lot to be desired. Yet in spite of these shortcomings, 
perceived or otherwise, Australians should keep a balanced view of American foreign policy in 
general, and be wary of embracing anti-Americanism in particular. The reasons for this are as 
follows. 
Firstly, regarding the question of Soviet intentions, it is almost impossible to prove what 
didn’t happen as opposed to what did. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union did not invade 
Western Europe, North Korea did not move against the South, and the nuclear holocaust feared 
by so many was somehow avoided. This, of course, means one of two things. Either Soviet 
intentions were not those of global domination, that its motivation was primarily that of 
securing its own borders, and that American concerns were grossly exaggerated; or, the Soviet 
intentions were indeed a commitment to the erosion of free world influence through all means 
                                                     
 12 An early study on this subject can be found in Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin's Postwar Army 
Reappraised”, International Security. 7, 3  (Winter 1982/83), p. 110-138 
13 For an excellent, first-hand account of the American decision-making dynamics during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, see Ernest R. May & Phillip D. Zelikow, (Eds). The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).  Incidentally, this work was used as the 
historical base for the film “Thirteen Days”. 
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necessary, and that this grand design was deterred by the combined strength of the free world, 
led by the United States. If, as critics say, that Americans misread ‘reality’ during this time, 
there must be a reason why so many obviously intelligent individuals did so. The extent of 
Stalin’s paranoia and ruthlessness are well known, and given his early association with Hitler, 
his later association with Mao Tse-Tsung, the possession of the largest ground army on the 
globe, and a presumed first-strike capability, the fact that such a large number of officials came 
to the same conclusion and thus based their planing on worst-case scenarios says something. 
Until more conclusive eastern bloc evidence is found to prove otherwise, we have to consider 
both sides of the debate over Soviet intentions equally.   
In a similar vein, one must consider the well-worn, and perhaps clichéd, analogy of the 
glass being half-full as opposed to half-empty. In response to the counterfactual proposition that 
had American been more conciliatory then the worst moments in the Cold War could have been 
avoided, one must in turn meet this with a similar counterfactual - what if the Americans had 
not have acted as they did? How would the world look today if Hitler had been successful in his 
conquest of Europe? Or even worse, and considering both views of Soviet intentions, what 
would the world be like today under the Stalinist brand of Communism? Australians in 
particular need to remember that a large number of Americans were killed during World War II 
in an effort to preserve the Australian way of life against fascist aggression, an effort that 
proved ultimately to be successful. If it wasn’t for the United States the Japanese would have 
almost certainly invaded Australia, and these critics, therefore, would not have the luxury of 
criticising the United States within the democracy that the United States itself played such a 
vital part in securing. In addition to being conveniently overlooked by many in Australian 
academia, one suspects that this irony is lost on many of those individuals and organisations that 
embrace the burning of American presidential effigies with such enthusiasm. When viewed in 
these terms, one finds it difficult not to agree with the recent comment that the priorities of “US 
bashers” are indeed “odd”.14 
The inconsistencies of the American Cold War commitment to defend the free world 
against authoritarian communism, and the irony it has engendered, is not just limited to 
American policymakers and their defenders. Like the targets of their dissent, many Cold War 
critics are victims of irony themselves and some of the most vociferous critics of perceived 
American moral superiority have themselves been supporters of or apologists for dictatorial 
regimes. As one commentator as recently pointed out, “those leaders of the moratorium marches 
against the US during the Vietnam War had little to say about the fate of human rights in 
Indochina after the communist victories.” Many Australians - such as Labor ministers Tom 
                                                     
14 Editorial, “Odd Priorities of US-bashers” The Australian, October 28, 2003. 
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Uren, Clyde Cameron and the recently deceased Jim Cairns - were naked apologists for 
authoritarian dictatorships in both Vietnam and China. The same is true for American 
intellectuals. Noam Chomsky spent much of the 1970s denouncing the Carter administration for 
its human rights policies, and tried ardently to discredit reports of massive human rights 
violations in Vietnam and a holocaust in Cambodia. At the risk of over-dramatisation, one sees 
the point of a recent commentary that, when viewed in these terms, Chomsky, like his anti-
American cult followers in Australia and otherwise, was “a Stalinist wolf in libertarian sheep's 
clothing.”15  
Finally, we should be aware of the need to keep in mind what is now known against 
what was known at the time. In the post-Cold War world, Australians know how history panned 
out, whereas the policymakers of the time did not. Archival evidence makes clear that during 
the Cold War Americans were primarily concerned with halting the spread of authoritarian 
Communism, preserving free world security, and defending its core values. They did not know 
that - assuming Realists are correct - Kym Ill Sung, not Stalin, was the brainchild behind the 
Korean War, that the immense Soviet army upon which Americans based so much of their Cold 
War strategy was very likely comprised of severely outdated equipment and technology, and 
that the policies they developed in response to combating the Soviet threat during the Cold War, 
especially in the Middle East, would in some way give rise to the widespread sense of 
discontent in the Arab world today. Given that these notions are still subject to much debate, 
and given that the Soviet Union, like Nazi Germany, was an authoritarian power, had a 
repressive political system, expansionist foreign policy and a predisposition towards the use of 
force, is it any wonder that American officials chose to believe the worst? Based upon what was 
known at the time, and viewed in these terms, their policies were understandable, if not 
justifiable.  
Does this excuse US mistakes? Certainly not. But these balancing perspectives as to 
American actions during the Cold War put in perspective popular attitudes towards the United 
States in contemporary Australian society. They are, in sum, more a means to correct the 
balance more than they are a justification for American behaviour, and as this essay 
demonstrates questions over the nature and conduct of American foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War world - particularly as they relate to Australia - are much more complicated than many of 
critics make out. 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 Morris, “US: A Valued Friend”, The Australian. 
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